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Abstract
In recent years, opposition to Communism has emerged as Sidney Hook’s central
philosophical legacy in the eyes of scholars and historians, who tend to ignore all
of Hook’s pre-Cold War philosophical contributions. Furthermore, critics who
treat Hook’s anti-Communism often accuse him of abandoning pragmatism for
dogmatism in his later career. In this essay, I argue that Hook’s long-standing fight
against Communism should be understood as an unwavering application of the
democratic method in line with his mentor John Dewey’s understanding of pragmatism as well as the commitment to scientific empiricism espoused by earlier
pragmatists C. S. Peirce and William James.
Sidney Hook’s intellectual legacy is steeped in controversy. Matthew Bagger calls
Hook “an unjustly neglected figure [whose] relative obscurity owes [in part] to his
renown as a cold warrior, which repelled the generation of scholars that came of
age in the late nineteen sixties and seventies.”1 Indeed, for many scholars, a first
point of reference for Sidney Hook is not pragmatism, nor even Hook’s teacher and
mentor John Dewey, but Hook’s staunch commitment to anti-Communism. In
2004, Richard Rorty wrote of him that “at the present time (if perhaps not forever)
our major interest in Hook will be in his crusade against the influence of Stalinism on US intellectual and political life,”2 an assertion that has yet to be disproven
in the years since. With few exceptions, critical scholarship surrounding Hook
since the 1980s has tended to focus primarily on his anti-Communism, from the
Committee for Cultural Freedom to the Waldorf Conference to Hook’s denouncement and suggested suspension of academics who were Communist Party members. Perhaps even worse, Hook has been lambasted for being so swept up in his
anti-Communist agenda that his stance becomes distinctly non-pragmatic. On
this point, Robert Talisse writes that philosophers who consider Hook at all often
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read him as “abandoning Deweyan pragmatism for some awkward combination
of analytic philosophy and conservative politics”3 in his later career. In popular
culture, Hook has become a celebrated figure for the American Right,4 who laud
him for his unyielding anti-Communist stances before and during the Cold War,
as well as his later opposition to affirmative action and the adoption of multicultural curricula by colleges and universities. Hook received the Presidential Medal
of Freedom from President Ronald Reagan in 1985, and the National Association
of Scholars has presented its Sidney Hook Memorial Award to notable right-wing
figures including Thomas Sowell and Gertrude Himmelfarb.
Considering the controversy Hook has generated among scholars and academics, as well as the way in which he has been generally overlooked or dismissed by leftist philosophers and intellectuals who condemn his hard line Cold War stances, it is
vital for his intellectual legacy (as well as pragmatism’s wider reputation) to examine
his anti-Communist views closely and to determine their relationship to his Deweyan pragmatism. My reading of Hook indicates that he should be viewed as less of a
Cold War villain and more as a victim of misreading. Richard J. Bernstein has written
that a common way of thinking about Freud’s writings on religion5 “does the greatest violence to what he is trying to show us,”6 and I contend that a parallel situation
has occurred with Hook’s staunch anti-Communist stances before and during the
Cold War. I will argue that Sidney Hook’s long-standing fight against Communism
does not constitute a deviation from or betrayal of pragmatism, as some scholars
have concluded. Rather, Hook’s unwavering commitment to democracy as method
is in line with both his mentor John Dewey’s understanding of pragmatism as well as
the commitment to scientific empiricism espoused by earlier pragmatist figures like
Charles S. Peirce and William James. In spite of pragmatism’s decline in popularity
around mid-century,7 Hook nevertheless succeeded in championing an engaged and
politically active philosophy centered on the application of the democratic method.
Between his contributions to Cold War anti-Communist politics and his
endorsements by conservative scholars and intellectuals as a man who represented
traditional American values, it comes as little surprise that there is no love lost between
Hook and politically left-leaning scholars or academics. Ruth R. Wisse has observed
that in several volumes published on the New York Intellectuals (NYI)8 in the mid1980s, Hook “emerges [as] a favorite antagonist.”9 Alan Wald, for example, accuses
Hook of not only betraying the socialist, revolutionary views of his youth, but of refusing to admit it. On this point, he writes, “Hook would never acknowledge that the
change in his views could be explained by social pressures brought on him and . . . a
loss of ability to view the world from the class perspective of the oppressed.”10 Russell
Jacoby is more straightforward about why scholars have not been particularly kind to
Hook, arguing that leftists “feel little affection for a philosopher who worked nights
to establish the grounds to exclude subversives, communists, and student radicals from universities. Hook’s publications relentlessly raise the alarm that leftists,
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communists, radicals, and what he calls ‘ritualist liberals’ endanger freedom.”11 Tity de
Vries points out that many biographers of the NYI accuse the group, Hook included,
of “sell[ing] out their critical and non-conformist position,”12 explaining that the NYI
are primarily studied by “liberal and left historians, who either [deny] an increasing
conservatism among the NYI or who [attack] them for becoming conservatives in
the 1950s and 1960s.”13 While the NYI typically have socialist roots, scholars have
noted a general trend toward neoconservatism in them. (Hook denied this accusation, insisting that he remained a democratic socialist and criticizing neoconservative
figures like Hilton Kramer.) Taken together, these portraits suggest a fairly strong
bias against both Hook and the NYI by academics, scholars, and historians who
view them as having forsaken their socialist, Marxist roots in favor of what Nathan
Abrams has called an “alliance with the anticommunist hegemony.”14
Arguably worse than Hook’s habitual casting as the villain of narratives
surrounding the NYI, he has also been accused of being unpragmatic in his antiCommunist views. Cornel West writes that Hook’s attachment to “tendentious
cold war ideology”15 clouded and overshadowed his commitment to Deweyan
pragmatism. Similarly, Robert Westbrook argues in a review of Hook’s memoir
Out of Step that after his break with Communism in the mid-thirties, Hook maintained “an inflexibly essentialist conception of communism, [. . . which resulted in]
a curiously unpragmatic way of looking at the world.”16 In his critique of Hook’s
Cold War politics, John Capps specifically points to Hook’s argument in favor of
a policy that excluded members of the Communist Party from university teaching
positions. Capps argues that far from being pragmatist, “Hook’s position is much
closer to the sort of logical argument characteristic of early analytic philosophy”17
and that such a position is “at odds with other elements of his philosophical identity as a pragmatist.”18 In particular, Capps takes issue with Hook’s lack of consideration for individual cases and circumstances in his haste to declare that being a
card-carrying Communist “constituted prima facie grounds for dismissal.”19 Similar
to Capps, Edward Shapiro observes in Hook a “tendency to substitute dogmatism
for empirical evidence [in] the 1950s, when Hook maintained on a priori grounds
that Communists should not be allowed to teach”20 in universities. Both Capps and
Shapiro conclude that Hook’s lack of attention to context is distinctly unpragmatic.
Despite the criticism and controversy that surround his political and philosophical positions, Hook retains a small contingent of support, mostly from scholars
who examine the relationship between his pragmatist philosophy and his antiCommunist views. These scholars acknowledge that while Hook’s philosophical
stances became more polemic and perhaps even dogmatic by the end of his life, his
initial disdain for Communism and his strong anti-Communist stances during the
Cold War are rooted in and connected to his Deweyan pragmatism. Matthew Cotter
points to “the dangers associated with discussing Hook’s significance exclusively in
terms of his anti-Communism,”21 as this is insufficient “for an evaluation of his life’s
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work in its full complexity.”22 Rather, Cotter highlights Hook’s “unflagging commitment to democracy as a way of life in the face of totalitarianism”23 as a major defining
quality of his thought. Avital Bloch explains that Hook “combined pragmatism, as a
philosophical method, with anti-totalitarianism. He considered anti-totalitarianism
a political belief that is the imperative conclusion of a pragmatist examination of
politics.”24 Considering Hook’s recommendation of suspending or firing Communist Party members among university faculty, Gary Bullert argues that Hook “was
arguably applying the longstanding policy advocated by Dewey himself.”25 Similarly,
Robert Talisse contends that “there is nothing unpragmatic or anti-contextualist
about [Hook’s stance]. To the contrary, when taken in the context of the Cold War
and the threat the CP [Communist Party] was then reasonably believed to pose, it
seems a fully pragmatic response.”26 More recently, Laurence Jurdem has suggested
that “his argument in favor of firing these academics returned Hook to his lessons
in pragmatism, learned at the feet of John Dewey so many decades before, a pragmatism that stood as the key reason he had turned against Communism and the
Soviet Union in the first place.”27 Considered alongside one another, these critical
examinations of Hook’s philosophy converge around the point that Hook’s antiCommunist views are more nuanced and more closely tied to his understanding of
Dewey and pragmatism than other scholars have given him credit for.
My own argument adds to and extends the critical conversation surrounding
the relationship between Hook’s pragmatism and anti-Communism by suggesting
that Hook’s anti-Communist views are most accurately understood as an unwavering
application of the democratic method. Furthermore, I connect Hook’s commitment
to democracy as method with both Dewey’s understanding of democracy and the
commitment to empiricism and scientific method espoused by Dewey’s and Hook’s
classical pragmatist forerunners Charles S. Peirce and William James. In tracing a
line of pragmatist figures who were all unyielding in their application of a method,
I hope that scholars and historians of the Cold War, the New York Intellectuals, and
twentieth-century pragmatism will see Hook in a new light and that future studies of
Hook will add some much-needed nuance and complexity to his philosophical legacy.
Robert Talisse and Robert Tempio argue in the introduction to their edited
collection of Sidney Hook’s essays that central to his political philosophy “is the
radical conception of democracy that he inherited from John Dewey. It is with this
conception that one must begin, and it is in the context of this conception that one
must understand Hook’s other political commitments.”28 Dewey saw democracy
as cooperative and experimental, and he viewed freedom of thought as essential to
maintaining a democratic society. In “Democracy and Education Administration,”
Dewey argues, “The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual
to do as he pleases [. . . rather,] the basic freedom is that of freedom of mind and
of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce
freedom of intelligence.”29 He goes on to say that political democracy “must be
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buttressed by the presence of democratic methods in all social relationships.”30 In
other words, Dewey believed that open and informed inquiry was of utmost importance to democracy and that democratic methods should be applied in the social as
well as the political realm. Similarly, he writes in Democracy and Education that an
undesirable society “is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free
intercourse and communication of experience.”31 Like Dewey, Hook viewed the
abilities to freely collaborate, exchange ideas with others, and reach one’s own conclusions without being influenced by outside forces as cornerstones of democracy.
Furthermore, Hook insisted on Dewey’s rule of applying the democratic method
in social and political arenas alike to support free and open inquiry.
Democracy, for Hook, entails a commitment to a procedure and a method
rather than any specific theory or belief system about how the world works. Talisse and Tempio argue that Hook opposed any movement that operated outside of
democratic processes and any policy that could not be established using the democratic method.32 In fact, Hook believed that democracy had established itself as a
superior social method. On this point, he argues,
Let us remember that when we are called upon to fight for democracy we
are not asked to fight for an ideal which has just been proposed as a merely
possible valid ideal for our times; we already have considerable evidence in
its behalf, the weight of which, unfortunately too often, is properly evaluated by some critics only when democracy is lost or imperiled. We have
every reason to believe that we are fighting for a truth [. . .] in contradistinction to others who fight for their truths, we are prepared to establish
to reasonable men that democracy is the better alternative.33

In Hook’s philosophy, democracy must be applied as a method; that is, there can be
no absolutes in our beliefs about democracy except the way in which we test those
beliefs. If society wavers in its application of democracy as a rule of living, then it
ceases to follow the method and can no longer call itself democratic.
Hook’s commitment to method is evident from his earliest writings. In his
dissertation The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, he argues that scientific rules or laws
“can only be established by experiment and cannot be deduced from a priori notions
or assumed to hold for one set of properties on the ground that they hold for any
other.”34 Here Hook emphasizes the necessity of experimentation as a means of
verifying scientific principles—using the scientific method to test results. He later
asks how a proposition is determined to be false and offers by way of response that
it is “not by a leap of intuition but by a test of its implications—and the implication to be recognizable must be of a type which is evidenced in some experienced
context.”35 Thus, for Hook, testable, observable experience is critical to determining
the truth or falsity of an idea, once again highlighting the importance of applying
the scientific method to verify one’s results.
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Hook applies his thinking about the scientific method—the notion that science is self-corrective—to his understanding of democracy. Because our society
is ever changing and we are consistently faced with new situations or ideas, Hook
advises that the most important question is “What method shall we follow in developing new beliefs and testing the old? For it is clear that no matter what belief we
come to regard as valid, the evidence of its validity will depend in part, at least,
upon the method which has been followed in reaching it.”36 Hook identifies three
values central to a democratic way of life: first, a belief in the “intrinsic worth or
dignity”37 of individuals; second, a belief in the value of diversity and variety; and
finally, “a faith in some method by [which] conflicts are resolved.”38 On this last
point, Hook elaborates, “Since the method must be the test of all values, it would
not be inaccurate to call it the basic value in the democratic way of life. [. . .] In a
democracy it must be directed to all issues, to all conflicts, if democracy is not to
succumb to the dangers which threaten it from both within and without.”39 Therefore, the democratic method, which Hook equates with free and open inquiry and
application of the scientific method, is the cornerstone of any society that calls itself
a democracy. Throughout his life, Hook maintained that the “democratic process
is more important than any predetermined program,”40 and this ideal was particularly evident in his dealings with Communism.
In his early years, Hook had similarly viewed Marx’s dialectical method as
an empirical method of verification. Christopher Phelps argues that in Hook’s 1933
volume Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, Hook recommends “an experimental intellectual method, with knowledge considered hypothetical, fallible, and
provisional, ideas held true only insofar as verifiable in experience or practice,
and knowledge created and obtained, not solely received as sense-impression.”41 Like
the scientific method, the dialectic method was experimental and its results were
contingent upon verification in experience. Phelps concludes that for the young
socialist Hook, “historical materialism was experimental naturalism,”42 and indeed,
Hook himself writes in 1936 that “properly understood, dialectical materialism is a
form of historical, experimental naturalism which stresses the role of human activity,
under determinate conditions, in transforming the social world.”43 Yet just four years
later in 1940, Hook wrote a letter to Albert Einstein in which his view of dialectical
materialism had changed significantly. In this letter, Hook reveals, “I am at work on
an extended critique of ‘dialectical materialism,’ the state philosophy of Soviet Russia, which seems to me every whit as false and pernicious as current ‘philosophical’
doctrines in Germany.”44 Hook’s reversal on dialectical materialism stems from the
same source as his certainty that Communism was a threat to democracy.
In Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, Hook distinguishes his analysis of
Marx from what he terms “orthodox Marxism,”45 which he understands as “an emasculation of Marx’s thought.”46 One specific fault Hook finds with orthodox Marxism
is its insistence on seeking the unity of Marx’s thought through his conclusions rather
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than his methods. On this point, he writes, “If Marx’s thought possesses unity, it
is not to be found in his specific conclusions but in his method of analysis directed
by the revolutionary purposes and needs of the international working class. The
method, to be sure, is to be checked in the light of his conclusions; but the latter are
derivative, not central. They are tentative and contingent.”47 He goes on to explain
that it is therefore possible “to dissociate the Marxian method from any specific set of
conclusions, or any particular political tactic advocated in its name. This is another
way of saying that there is nothing a priori in Marx’s philosophy; it is naturalistic,
historical and empirical throughout.”48 However, Hook criticizes so-called orthodox Marxists for their misuse and abuse of dialectical materialism, claiming that
“whereas Marx projected it as a method of understanding and making history, his
disciples have tried to convert it into a system of sociology.”49 Hook believed that this
misinterpretation of Marxism led to unchallenged dogmatism among Communists.
In an article on Marxism published the same year as Towards the Understanding of
Karl Marx, Hook argues that refusing to distinguish Marx’s analysis from the subjective view of economic classes inherent to his (Marx’s) philosophy “has led to the
mischievous myth that Marxism is an objective science which can demonstrate both
the inevitability of communism and its inherent moral superiority.”50
After dialectical materialism became the official doctrine of the U.S.S.R., Hook
observed that rather than remaining flexible, resulting in tentative conclusions (as
he believed it had in the writings of Marx and Engels), any flexibility inherent to
the dialectical method was “sacrificed for unverifiable dogma.”51 Hook saw that
discovering knowledge or truth was far less important to Communists than asserting official state doctrine. In a 1940 review of Engels’s book Dialectics of Nature,
Hook scathingly criticizes this sacrifice of knowledge on the altar of the Party’s
authority. He writes, “Although it possesses no scientific importance whatsoever,
Engels’s manuscript is none the less extremely valuable as a source book of the current state philosophy of the U.S.S.R., dialectical materialism. Whenever the party
line changes in science, the justifying quotations are taken from Engels, who did
not even have the status of a gifted amateur in science.”52 Hook concludes that the
book’s preface, written by J.B.S. Haldane, who claimed to have cured himself of
stomach irritation by reading Lenin, “is a pitiful illustration of what happens to a
fine intelligence when it gets political religion.” In his autobiography Out of Step,
Hook recalls that after the Moscow Trials, Dewey admitted that “regardless of the
accuracy of [Hook’s] interpretation of Marx, it was largely an intellectual conceit:
To the extent that ideas counted in the world, Marxism in our time, he said, was the
state philosophy of the Soviet Union and its satellites.”53 Hook felt similarly about
the dialectical method. In a 1937 article entitled “Dialectic and Nature,” he concludes,
“the dialectic method can claim to have meaning and validity only when it is understood to be synonymous with scientific method [and] since in its traditional formulation it is burdened with many misleading and mistaken conceptions, it would be
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more conducive to clear thinking if the phrase were dropped.”54 In other words, in
spite of whether Hook’s assessment of the Marxian dialectic as method in volumes
like Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx was correct, dialectical materialism
had been verified in experience to be the version espoused by orthodox Marxists
and orthodox dialectical materialists. The dialectical method was no longer open to
empiricism and experience; it was closed to all ideals except those of the CP.
In addition, Hook’s experience with Communists cemented his belief that
Communists were only concerned with advancing the goals of the Party. Communism, as it was implemented by the Soviet Union, was irreconcilable with the
communally agreed upon nature of inquiry and truth provided by the method
of democracy because it was totalitarian. Avital Bloch explains that totalitarian
regimes “violated individual liberties and free culture, whose protection was for
Hook the primary condition for any political order calling itself a democracy.”55 A
pragmatist like Hook is necessarily anti-totalitarian because pragmatism supports
open inquiry and exchange of ideas. In fact, Peirce defines truth as “the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,”56 linking scientific
inquiry with the search for truth. Scientific truths are confirmed by a community
of inquirers who arrive at the same conclusion, and in order for such a conclusion
to be reached, people must be free to investigate ideas. For Hook, democracy operates under parallel principles: people must be free to apply the democratic method
by ensuring that as many voices and opinions as possible are welcomed and considered. Totalitarianism is by its very nature opposed to such a goal, as it operates
under the method of authority57 Peirce discusses in “The Fixation of Belief” wherein
opinions are regulated by a governing body (in this case, the Communist Party)
and any dissent from the knowledge or truths espoused by this body is stifled.
The Moscow Trials are often cited by scholars and historians of the New York
Intellectuals as a turning point in the group’s relationship to Stalinism, and Sidney
Hook was no exception. Neil Jumonville writes of the NYI: “After the wrenching
Moscow Trials of 1936, their bitter hatred for the centralization, deceit, murder, antiintellectualism, and undemocratic nature of Stalinism led them to become anti-Stalinist socialists.”58 Alexander Bloom observes that after the Moscow Trials, the NYI’s
“prevailing anti-Stalinist ethos had not yet turned anti-Communist. Stalinism, not
communism, emerged as the enemy.”59 While not yet as critical of Communism in the
mid-1930s as he would be in later years, the trials nevertheless had a profound effect
on Hook and set the stage for his later anti-Communism. Hook discusses the Moscow Trials and their impact in Out of Step, calling them “a decisive turning point in
[his] intellectual and political development,”60 when he “discovered the face of radical
evil—as ugly and petrifying as anything the Fascists had revealed up to that time.”61
Aside from the general disillusionment of the NYI with Stalinism after
the Moscow Trials and the Hitler-Stalin Pact,62 Hook’s experience with the Waldorf Conference also led him to believe that Communists were not interested in
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intellectual freedom or knowledge generated from open and communal inquiry,
two qualities Hook saw as essential to democratic progress. Neil Jumonville writes
that of the NYI, Hook was the most adamant “about the Waldorf Conference’s
betrayal of intellectual values, and his passion on this point was a hallmark of his
life and ideals.”63 Hook had requested that he be allowed to speak at the Waldorf
Conference (formally known as the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World
Peace but called the Waldorf Conference because of its location). Hook was concerned about the conference because it was promoted as an event for intellectuals
to discuss current affairs; however, Communists dominated among the speakers.
Hook wrote to Harlow Shapley, one of the conference organizers, requesting to
read a paper at the conference, but he was denied, which Hook interpreted as intellectual dishonesty. According to Jumonville, “Hook told Shapley he would argue that there
were no national, class, or party ‘truths’ in science, and that international peace and
science had been ‘seriously undermined’ by those doctrines.”64 Like Peirce and James
before him, Hook firmly believed that we gain knowledge and insight based upon our
observation and analysis of facts, and not based upon our preconceived notions or
feelings about the facts. Like Dewey before him, Hook was determined to reject “party
discipline in favor of freedom of thought.”65 In other words, Hook saw Communism
as distorting and obfuscating scientific truth and progress for the sake of pushing its
own agenda, and to Hook, this was fundamentally antidemocratic. In “Naturalism and
Democracy,” Hook writes, “scientific empiricism as a philosophy is more congenial to
a democratic than to an antidemocratic community, for it brings into the open light
of criticism the interests in which moral values and social institutions are rooted.”66
Considering what had become of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union,
the Moscow Trials, and his experience with the Waldorf Conference, Hook was convinced that Communists had no interest in scientific progress or the pursuit of real
knowledge, for they had made clear their stance that the Party trumped free and open
communication and exchange of ideas. In so doing, Communism had revealed itself
to be directly in conflict with democratic progress. Hook explains in Pragmatism and
the Tragic Sense of Life that “the only reliable evidence”67 of a person’s change of heart
on a subject is “the change in his habits, his deeds, his personal and public behavior.”68
Ultimately, the Waldorf Conference cemented for Hook that Communist Party members would have no change of heart with respect to putting free and open discussion
above their concern for advancing the Party. Robert Talisse has argued that Hook
“sees free consent and free discussion as epistemic matters”69 integral to democracy
and that “in particular, citizens must be able to inquire.”70 For Hook, Communists
cared more about their political agenda than about scientific or communal inquiry,
and thus, the Communist Party was a threat to the democratic method.
Hook’s application of democracy as a method has a direct parallel to the
empirical method in the classical pragmatist writings of Peirce and James. In “The
Fixation of Belief,” Peirce describes four methods of belief and explains why, of

Volume 33 (1) 2017

98

C. Ferriter

the four, the method of science is the most logical choice. The first method is the
method of tenacity. This is the “ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-sand” method of belief,
where one dislikes being undecided and as a result feels that holding on to a belief
that does not waver will provide satisfaction and calmness. Second, the method of
authority is the method of some governing body that concerns itself with regulating people’s opinions on certain matters and preventing or quashing any opinions
that contradict the views this governing body has adopted. The third method, the
a priori method, allows us to adopt any propositions that we find ourselves inclined
to believe. But Peirce’s preferred method is the method of science, which he explains
as follows: “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our
opinions about them; [. . .] by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can
ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient
experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion.”71
Therefore, by communal inquiry through application of this method, we will get
closer to the truth and increase our collective knowledge about the world. Peirce
argues that no doubts about the scientific method arise from its practice, as is the
case with each of the other three methods of belief, for the method of science is
the only method that presents a distinction between a right and wrong way of
carrying it out. On this point he writes, “The test of whether I am truly following
the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the
contrary, itself involves the application of the method.”72 This means that a person
following the scientific method will reach a conclusion through direct experience
and observation of the facts, and not through his or her feelings about the facts.
Peirce believed that the scientific method proved itself to be the best method
of increasing our knowledge and coming closer to the truth because our conclusions
are revisable, which enables science to withstand the test of time. While it is true that
we may reach faulty conclusions, these will eventually be corrected. Sidney Hook
held a similar view of democracy. If democracy is a method, then “the self-corrective
procedures of democracy”73 will result in greater knowledge and a greater number
of people who are able to contribute to society over time. As with science, the test
of whether the method of democracy is being followed involves applying it: ensuring individual rights and the ability to participate freely in the democratic process.
Like Peirce, William James argues in Pragmatism that the pragmatist “turns
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.”74 This stands in contrast to what James calls “the empiricist temper,”75 which
is concerned with facts, action, and experience. Similar to what Peirce says about
the method of science, James believes empiricism to be a superior method of thinking because it is based on our observation of facts and incorporating those facts
into the stream of our experience. The empiricist decides the validity of conflicting
ideas by “tracing [their] respective practical consequences.”76 In Hook’s conception
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of democracy as a method, those who follow it must likewise examine the practical consequences of adopting one policy over another, lest those decisions serve to
reduce democracy rather than increase it.
Hook’s experiences with the Communist Party convinced him that advancing a predetermined set of objectives was more important to them than allowing
for intellectual differences and rational debate countenanced by the democratic
method of government. Robert Talisse observes that while it is possible to judge
“with the hindsight of fifty years that Hook overestimated the threat that the CP
[Communist Party] posed,”77 in considering Hook’s philosophical and political
positions regarding Communism, the question is “about what Hook was justified
in believing, not about what we should now believe—again with all the clarity of
hindsight—about the severity of the threat.”78 Similarly, Richard Rorty argues that
those who did not live through World War II “may find it hard to appreciate how
necessary [Hook’s] crusade [against Stalinism] was,”79 particularly since it was difficult for many on the political Left in the US “to admit the existence of the gulag.”80
Indeed, Hook writes toward the end of Out of Step that the arc of his thought had
shifted over time, stating, “I no longer believe that the central problem of our time
is the choice between capitalism and socialism but the defense and enrichment
of a free and open society against totalitarianism.”81 Thus, while it is easy to conclude from the safe distance of a post-Cold War world that Hook’s staunch antiCommunism was unnecessary, Hook and many others genuinely believed that
totalitarian Communism posed a real and significant threat to American democracy based on their experiences with Communists and the CP.
Robert Talisse points out that, throughout his life, Hook never displayed
“a refusal to argue, a reluctance to listen to an opposing view, or an unwillingness to
reconsider his own position in the light of opposing considerations.”82 Given Hook’s
adherence to the primacy of open inquiry and discussion as well as to both the scientific
and the democratic method throughout his lifetime, I must conclude with Talisse, and
contra many Cold War and NYI scholars and historians, that Hook did not betray or
abandon pragmatism in his hardline stance against Communism. Rather, he demonstrated a sustained commitment to the scientific and democratic methods, which was
in line with the philosophy of earlier pragmatists, including Peirce, James, and Dewey.
In an essay on the common philosophy that democracies share, Hook argues,
“We cannot make absolutes of doctrines, tastes, or principles without inviting the evils
of fanaticism. Nonetheless, there must be one working absolute on which there can be
no compromise, about which we must be fanatical: the rules of the game, by which we
settle differences.”83 For Hook, the “rules of the game” meant democracy, which explains
why he so fanatically defended it from any perceived threats. As Peirce and James were
committed to the method of empiricism, so was Hook committed to the democratic
method. He adds, “There is no inconsistency whatsoever in being intolerant of those who
show intolerance.”84 To Hook, Communists had shown themselves to be intolerant of
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open discussion and intellectual inquiry, and thus, their goals were not compatible with
the goals of those who wished, like Hook, to preserve and extend democratic freedoms.
During the Cold War, Communism loomed large in the national consciousness as a
potential threat to democracy, and Hook was determined not to let intellectuals who were
affiliated with the Communist Party subvert free inquiry for the sake of a politics where
intellectual progress and scientific contributions were not valued or given consideration.
Hook’s work, like that of his mentor John Dewey, points to democracy as an
action that must be realized, open to continued growth and change rather than
mired in old ways of thinking about ideas or serving the needs of one group or
ideology at the expense of others. Hook’s anti-Communism was ultimately concerned with preserving the democratic ideals of freedom and open inquiry that we
often take for granted. For this reason, pragmatism likewise played a significant
role before and during the Cold War as the source of Hook’s fervent commitment
to democracy. In an increasingly politically polarized society, Hook’s legacy of
democracy as method seems more important than ever if Americans are to come
together in support of the democratic method rather than remaining divided by
our devotion to the goals or doctrines of a single figure or political party.
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